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"I wish flying had never been invented. The world has shrunk since the
Wrights got into the air... ,
I. INTRODUCTION
NTERNATIONAL AIR transportation is a massive, multibil-
lion dollar industry, transporting cargo and hundreds of mil-
lions of passengers to thousands of locations around the globe.
While the domestic operations of airlines within a country are
indisputably within the jurisdiction of that country, to facilitate
international aviation, a harmonization of rules and regulations
* B.A., University of Rochester; J.D., American University Washington College
of Law; Candidate for L.L.M. in International and Comparative Law, Georgetown
University Law Center; Senior Counsel, US Airways, Inc. The views presented in
this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the author's em-
ployer. I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Allan I. Mendelsohn and
Professor Warren L. Dean for their counsel in preparing this article.
1 WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE LAST LION: WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL-VISIONS
OF GLORY 1874-1932 11 (1983) (quoting Sir Winston Churchill).
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is necessary to avoid conflicts. For example, what if Country A
allowed the installation of a particular widget on each aircraft
arriving at or departing Country A, and Country B banned the
installation of that widget on aircraft flying into or out of Coun-
try B? Moreover, what if there were a treaty between Country A
and Country B that prohibited Country B from adopting its reg-
ulation? This note analyzes that issue as presented by legislation
in the United States, commonly known as the "Gorton Amend-
ment," in which the United States prohibited both American
and foreign air carriers from installing, transporting, operating,
or permitting the use of any gambling device in foreign air
transportation.2
The first section of this note provides a brief overview of the
history of commercial aviation and the international legal struc-
tures that have accompanied its development and facilitated a
needed level of uniformity of rules governing aviation around
the world. The second section of this note describes those ef-
forts and structures following World War II. The third section
of this note addresses the issue of a country unilaterally chang-
ing the standards to which it holds foreign airlines in interna-
tional operations. The fourth section reviews the treatment of
treaties under American law. The fifth section compares the dif-
fering views of the Gorton Amendment under American and in-
ternational law. Finally, this note concludes by suggesting that
while the Gorton Amendment is valid under U.S. law, it was an
ill-conceived and poorly implemented extraterritorial extension
of U.S. regulatory jurisdiction, especially in the context of the
international regime of international civil aviation.
II. BACKGROUND
In the years following the Wright Brothers' first mechanically
powered flight in 1903,a the aviation industry began to take
form. The new found power to travel great distances in almost
infinitely shorter periods than formerly possible was extremely
attractive. Soon there were more destinations than any single
airline could handle, clearly indicating the need for coordina-
2 49 U.S.C. § 41311 (1994). This article does not discuss the obvious inconsis-
tency between the Gorton Amendment and the burgeoning of the gambling in-
dustry throughout the United States over the past few decades.
3 See generally FRED HOwARD, WILBUR AND ORVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE
WRIGHT BROTHERS (1987) (detailing the lives of the Wright Brothers and their
accomplishments).
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tion and regulation. As Winston Churchill suggested, the world
had gotten smaller virtually over night.4
The first response to the growing international aviation indus-
try came in 1919, the first year when international commercial
aviation began in earnest.5 The Convention for the Regulation
of Aerial Navigation of 1919 created the International Commis-
sion for Air Navigation (C.I.N.A.) as a permanent body under
the League of Nations. Ironically, the United States, the indus-
try's founder and world leader, was not a signatory to that con-
vention-mainly because the Senate had voted against joining
the League of Nations.6 Nevertheless, the United States did join
the Pan American Convention on Commercial Aviation that
adopted many features of C.I.N.A. The United States also be-
came a signatory to the Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Regarding International Air Transportation, better
known as the Warsaw Convention, which was concluded ten
years later in 1929.7
World War II proved the overwhelming significance of flight
for the future. Its application for the postwar era seemed unlim-
ited. Thus, in 1944, toward the end of World War II, many na-
tions sent representatives to a conference on regulation of the
air transport industry in Chicago, Illinois. The result of their
efforts was the so-called Chicago Convention on International
Civil Aviation.8 The Chicago Convention established the first
two "Freedoms of the Air"-the right of innocent passage and
the right to land for technical purposes without letting off or
taking on passengers, e.g., for refueling.9 Part II of the Chicago
4 See MANCHESTER, supra note 1.
5 See RICHARD Y. CHUANG, THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION: A
CASE STUDY OF A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 16 (1972).
6 See id. at 17; see also THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD 1005-06 (John A.
Garraty & Peter Gay eds., 1972) (discussing America's internal reasons for not
joining the League of Nations).
7 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, done October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (en-
tered into force Feb. 13, 1933) (entered into force for the United States Oct. 29,
1934) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
8 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 296 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
9 See id. at 61 Stat. 1181-82, 15 U.N.T.S. at 298. The five freedoms are:
First Freedom--The right to fly over another country without
landing.
Second Freedom-The right to make a landing for technical reasons
(e.g. refuelling [sic]) in another country without picking up/set-
ting down revenue traffic.
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Convention established the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (ICAO), as an agency of the United Nations, and succes-
sor to C.I.N.A. under the League of Nations. Its purpose was to
facilitate discussions and negotiations involving legal and techni-
cal issues of international aviation. Perhaps the most important
task assigned to ICAO was to " [p] romote safety of flight in inter-
national air navigation."'10 In pursuing that effort and the re-
lated tasks in the same article, the founders charged ICAO with
establishing international standards for all aspects of interna-
tional aviation, from international standards on markings on
cargo to airport procedures. They were, however, unable to
come to any resolutions regarding airline rates, acceptable levels
of capacity, tariffs, and other commercial rules for scheduled op-
erations. 1 Instead, they decided that the countries would de-
cide these issues among themselves. 12
III. THE POST WORLD WAR II ERA
In pursuing commercial aviation in the post World War II era,
countries were essentially left to themselves to adopt bilateral
agreements under which countries established the rules by
which their airlines could operate flights into other countries.
The United States, like most other countries, entered into many
such agreements. Most contain a provision that provides for
Third Freedom---The right to carry revenue traffic from your own
country (A) to the country (B) of your treaty partner.
Fourth Freedom--The right to carry traffic from country B back to
your own country A.
Fifth Freedom-The right of an airline from country A to carry reve-
nue traffic between country B and other countries such as C or D.
(This freedom cannot be used unless countries C or D also agree.)
RiGAS DoGANIs, FLYING OFF COURSE: THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
app. A (2d ed. 1991). There is also a "Sixth Freedom" that allows "[t]he use by an
airline of country A of two sets of third and fourth freedom rights to carry traffic
between two other countries but using its base at A as a transit point." Id.; see also
Jurgen Basedow, Symposium on U.S.-E. C. Legal Relations: Airline Deregulation in the
European Community-Its Background, Its Flaws, Its Consequences for E. C.-U.S. Rela-
tions, 13J. AIR L. & COM. 247, 248-250 (1994).
10 Chicago Convention, supra note 8, 61 Stat. at 1193, 15 U.N.T.S. at 326.
1 Capacity is, in effect, the number of passengers and amount of cargo that
airlines of one country can carry into another. Tariffs are the price of the "fares"
for that transportation and their associated terms (not a tax on imports as in its
more traditional definition).
12 See CHUANG, supra note 5, at IX (noting the failure of the Chicago Conven-
tion to establish economic regulations); ALAN P. DOBSON, FLY IN THE FACE OF
COMPETITION: THE POLICIES AND DIPLOMACY OF AIRLINE REGULATORY REFORM IN
BRITAIN, THE USA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1968-1994 19 (1995).
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each party to recognize the certificates of airworthiness 13 and
licenses granted by the other party in a fashion that parallels
Article 33 of the Chicago Convention, provided that the other
country's standards meet at least the minimum standards estab-
lished by ICAO. For example, the Civil Air Transport Agree-
ment between the United States and Japan provides:
Certificates of airworthiness, certificates of competency and
licenses issued or rendered valid by one Contracting Party, and
still in force, shall be recognized as valid by the other Con-
tracting Party for the purpose of operating the agreed services on
the specified routes, provided that the requirements under
which such certificates or licenses were issued or rendered valid
are equal to or above the minimum standards which may be es-
tablished pursuant to the Convention on International Civil Avia-
tion. Each Contracting Party reserves the right, however, to
refuse to recognize, for the purpose of flight above its own terri-
tory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to its own
nationals by another State.' 4
At the same time, each such agreement also contains a provi-
sion that allows each country to regulate the admission into, nav-
igation and operation within, and departure from its own
airspace. 15 The United States' Model Bilateral Air Transport
Agreement, now commonly known as the "Open Skies Agree-
ment," contains such a clause. 16
The question that necessarily arises is what would happen if
one of the parties to such an agreement sought to enforce a
different standard that was more restrictive-or sought to pro-
13 "Airworthiness" as used in the aviation industry means more than just being
capable of flight. It refers to an aircraft's conformance with its technical design
combined with adherence to the maintenance program for that aircraft pursuant
to applicable law.
14 Civil Air Transport Agreement, Aug. 11, 1952, U.S.-Japan, art. 7, 4 U.S.T.
1948, 1951-52.
15 See, e.g., id. at Art. 8(A). The Civil Air Transport Agreement provides:
The laws and regulations of one Contracting Party relating to the
admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in
international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of
such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the air-
craft of the airlines designated by the other Contracting Party, and
shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entrance into or de-
parture from or while within the territory of the first Contracting
Party.
Civil Air Transport Agreement, supra note 14, 4 U.S.T. at 1952.
16 United States: Model Bilateral Air Transport Agreement, Mar. 20, 1995, art.
6(1), 35 I.L.M. 1479, 1485 [hereinafter Model Bilateral ATA].
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hibit an aircraft configuration that otherwise met ICAO
standards?
IV. CHANGING THE RULES
What if an ICAO standard allowed the installation and opera-
tion on an aircraft of ovens meeting particular standards to heat
food (which they do), and Switzerland determined that airlines
could not operate such ovens on flights operating into or out of
Switzerland or while operating within Swiss airspace? Disputing
Switzerland's right to prohibit the operation of such ovens on
aircraft within its airspace would be difficult. After all, the Chi-
cago Convention clearly states, "The contracting States recog-
nize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over
the airspace above its territory."1 7 That, however, only answers
part of the question. Could Switzerland prohibit the operation
of the ovens before an aircraft reaches its airspace or after it
left-or indeed, could Switzerland prohibit even their installa-
tion on any aircraft operating into, out of, or through its
airspace?
On August 23, 1994, the United States essentially did just that
when the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of
1994 became law.18 Section 205 of that Act, commonly known
as the "Gorton Amendment," provides in pertinent part that
"[a] n air carrier or foreign air carrier may not install, transport,
or operate, or permit the use of, any gambling device on board
an aircraft in foreign air transportation." 9 When Senator Slade
Gorton (R-Wash.) introduced the amendment,2 ° he stated that
he intended to close a loophole in the law that prohibited Amer-
ican carriers from the same activities2 1 but which did not apply
1 Chicago Convention, supra note 8, 61 Stat. at 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. at 296.
18 Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat. 1569 (1994).
19 49 U.S.C. § 41311(a) (1994).
20 Sen. Gorton introduced his amendment on June 9, 1994, as Amendment
1767 to the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994. See 140
CONG. REC. 12, 486 (1994).
21 See id. at 12, 486-87. It is notable that in 1993, Northwest Airlines sought to
have Congress amend the Gambling Devices Act of 1962 to legalize in-flight gam-
bling for U.S. flagged air carriers. In contrast to the amendment to the law that
allows gambling on board U.S. based cruise ships, the panel rejected the idea
completely. See Julie Schmit, Senate Panel Rejects Airline Gambling, USA TODAY,
Nov. 10, 1993, at 1B; Brian C. O'Donnell, Gambling to Be Competitive: The Gorton
Amendment and International Law, 16 DICK.J. INT'L L. 251,266-70 (1997) (compre-
hensively discussing the amendment to the Johnson Act allowing gambling
aboard U.S. flagged cruise ships).
414
GAMBLING PROHIBITIONS
to foreign carriers-to create a level playing field where the
United States would prohibit foreign carriers from offering in-
flight gambling already prohibited on U.S. flagged carriers.22
Congress accepted it without debate.23
The problem, however, is that the U.S. legislation not only
prohibits gambling, but also the "installation" and "transporta-
tion" of gaming devices.24 In response to the amendment, the
Aviation Assembly, a group of civil aviation attaches in Washing-
ton, D.C.,25 submitted a letter dated August 19, 1994, to the
United States' Department of State protesting the Gorton
Amendment and claiming that it sought to improperly extend
the jurisdiction of the United States to conduct aboard foreign
aircraft when operated outside the United States' territory.26
The protest further stated:
For several decades it has been a central principle of the interna-
tional civil aviation regime that one state cannot unilaterally im-
pose its views on the manner in which airline flights of another
state's aircraft are conducted when outside the territory of the
first state. The Governments deem Section 205 of the FAA
Reauthorization Act [sic] to be an unprecedented intrusion on
that principle and inconsistent with international law governing
the jurisdiction of states over civil aviation matters.27
Nothing in the Aviation Assembly's protest concerned the do-
mestic application of the Gorton Amendment, i.e., if foreign air-
lines installed such devices on aircraft operating from their
22 See Gambling Devices Act of 1962, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (1994).
23 It is notable that the Gorton Amendment also directed the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to conduct a study on the safety and competitive impact of
in-flight gambling. See 140 CONG. Rc. 12, 486 (1994). That report was submit-
ted in March 1996 titled as "Report to the Congress, Video Gambling in Foreign
Air Transportation: Safety Effects, Competitive Consequences, Bilateral Issues &
Legal Framework." While that report provides an analysis of the commercial as-
pects of in-flight gambling, the portion of the report that addresses the interna-
tional legal aspects of the issue is limited to half of page 52. There the FAA noted
that the Gorton Amendment had "engendered formal diplomatic protests." The
FAA, however, does not discuss the legitimacy of those protests and simply con-
cludes that any foreign country could pursue a remedy by submitting the dispute
for arbitration.
24 See 49 U.S.C. § 41311(a) (1994).
25 The group is made up of embassies of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the Eu-
ropean Commission.
26 See Letter from the Aviation Assembly, to the United States' Department of
State (Aug. 19, 1994) (on file with the SMU Law Review Association).
27 Id.
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respective countries, they would have no difficulty, under their
view of international law, with the United States prohibiting the
operation of such devices while in American airspace-just as
the Swiss (in our example above) could prohibit the operation
of our fictional ovens within their airspace. The difficulty arises,
first, from the prohibition of even having the devices installed,
when doing so does not violate any airworthiness standards es-
tablished by ICAO, and, second, from the application of the stat-
ute to foreign aircraft operating outside American airspace.28
We are thus left with a situation in which the Chicago Conven-
tion and subsequent bilateral agreements obligate the United
States to accept certificates of airworthiness of foreign aircraft by
countries that are parties to those agreements, and to allow air-
craft that so comply with those foreign standards to operate into
and out of the United States. Yet the United States prohibits the
installation of gambling devices on such aircraft and takes the
position that the operation of such devices on flights into or out
of the United States violates American law.
According to the Transportation Department at the Royal
Netherlands Embassy, which coordinates the Aviation Assem-
bly,29 the United States never responded to the Assembly's pro-
test.30 At the same time, the states comprising the Assembly
28 See Steven Grover, Comment, Blackjack at Thirty Thousand Feet: America's At-
tempt to Enforce Its Ban on In-Flight Gambling Extraterritorially, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REv. 231, 238-40 (1998) (arguing that the Chicago Convention provides support
for certain extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States over aircraft). Your
present author submits that Grover is incorrect in arguing that the international
legal regime lends support to the legality of the Gorton Amendment under inter-
national law. He argues that because Article 1 of the Chicago Convention recog-
nizes each country's sovereignty over its own airspace (see supra note 17 and
accompanying text), any apparent infringement of international law or extrater-
ritorial consequences are merely incidental to the exercise of that domestic sover-
eignty. While that is the same conclusion that your author reaches in this article
in his analysis under American law, it does not follow properly under interna-
tional law. Under international law, treaties are comparable to contracts, under
which each party gives up something in exchange for something else, e.g., in a
bilateral air transportation agreement, each party abdicates certain of its rights to
not accept the airworthiness certificates of the other in exchange for the same in
return. If Mr. Grover's reasoning were to follow, that mutual commitment is not
truly binding, which is at odds with the concept of international treaties as bind-
ing agreements.
29 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
50 See International Airline Coalition on the Rule of Law, Concerning the Extra-Territo-
rial Aspect of Bill: Hearing on H.R 969 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House
Comm. on Transportation, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (testimony of William
Karas) (testimony regarding view of coalition of international carriers that exten-
416
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have not pursued the matter, and no dispute has been raised
under Chapter XVIII of the Chicago Convention which provides
for settlements of disputes, arbitrations and appeals in Articles
84, 85 and 86, respectively.
The so-called "Hatch Amendment" has created a situation
similar to that of the Gorton Amendment, but with far greater
impact and reaction.3 1 Public Law 104-132, which concerns an-
titerrorism, became law in 1996. Included in that legislation was
a provision introduced by Senator Orin Hatch (R-UT) that, with
further modification, amended 49 U.S.C. § 44906 as shown
here:
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall
continue in effect the requirement of section 129.25 of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations, that a foreign air carrier must
adopt and use a security program approved by the Administrator.
The Administrator may shall not approve a security program of a
foreign air carrier under section 129.25 only if the Administater
de-ides, or any successor regulation, unless the security program
pro..des passengers ot requires the foreign air carrier a--leel9-
pretection si -- tos the level those passengers wuld .rceive
der. the security programs f in its operations to and from airports
in the United States to adhere to the identical security measures that the
Administrator requires air carriers serving the same airport-The
airports to adhere to. The foregoing requirement shall not be interpreted
to limit the ability of the Administrator shall-require to impose addi-
tional security measures on a foreign air carrier t .e ..-ee .e&.
equivalent to those required of air carir se.ng the same air
per-t-f or an air carrier when the Administrator deci-determines
that the procedures are necessary to provide a level of rtecon
similar to that prvided passengers of the air carier erving th
. k 4 a specific threat warrants such additional measures. The
Administrator shall prescribe regulations to carry out this
section.3 2
sion of jurisdiction by the United States to activities occurring outside of the
United States violates international law, testimony related to prohibition of smok-
ing on aircraft destined for or departing from the United States and noting that
diplomatic protests regarding the Gorton Amendment on similar grounds were
given "short shrift").
31 See David Lord, The 'Hatch Amendment', AVIATION SECURITY INTERNATIONAL:
THE JOURNAL OF AiRPORT & AIRLINE SECURITY, April 1999, at 8 (describing the
history of the Hatch Amendment and resulting issues and disputes).
32 The original text of Sen. Hatch's amendment reads as follows:
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall
continue in effect the requirement of section 129.25 of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations, that a foreign air carrier must adopt
and use a security program approved by the Administrator. The
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
The effect of this provision is to require foreign carriers oper-
ating into the United States to apply the same security proce-
dures that American carriers must apply. The obvious problem
with this extraterritorial assertion ofjurisdiction is similar to the
problem with the Gorton Amendment, i.e., what if each country
were to pass its own version of the Hatch Amendment? This is
all the more troubling given that in most countries, airport and
aircraft security are completely or mostly government functions,
whereas in the United States pre-departure screening of passen-
gers and most other airport-based aviation security responsibili-
ties are obligations of airlines.3 Foreign air carriers have
vigorously protested the proposed FAA regulations designed to
implement the Hatch Amendment, and they have yet to be
adopted.34
The United States, however, is not the only country to pass
legislation that seemingly violates the international norms estab-
lished by ICAO. On November 16, 1998, the Council of the Eu-
ropean Union accepted Common Position (EC) No. 66/98
which adopts regulations on aircraft noise that are different
from, and some claim contrary to, ICAO standards. These stan-
dards effectively exclude the operation and sale of certain air-
craft which are predominantly of American manufacture-
including those modified with "hush kits" to comply with up-
dated ICAO noise standards-within and into Europe. These
new regulations have severely diminished the resale value of
large portions of certain aircraft flagged in the United States. A
complete analysis of that matter is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. 5 However, it is important to note that following vigorous
protests by the government of the United States, as well as by
various participants of the international aviation industry, the
Administrator shall only approve a security program of a foreign air
carrier under section 129.25, or any successor regulation, if the Ad-
ministrator decides the security program provides passengers of the
foreign air carrier a level of protection identical to the level those
passengers would receive under the security programs of air carri-
ers serving the same airport. The Administrator shall prescribe reg-
ulations to carry out this section.
Sen. Am. No. 1233 (Hatch) to S. 735, 104th Cong. (1995), published in CON. REC.
at S7794 (June 6, 1995).
33 See 14 C.F.R. pt. 107-108 (1999).
34 See Lord, supra note 31.
35 Compare Benedicte Claes, Aircraft Noise Regulation in the European Union: The
Huskit Problem, 65J. AIR L. & COM. 329 (2000) (presenting the European views of
the issue), with Troy A. Rolf, International Aircraft Noise Certification, 65 J. AR L. &
COM. 383 (2000) (presenting the American views of the issue).
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European Union postponed the application of its regulations
for one year to give the parties an opportunity to resolve the
dispute diplomatically.3 6
It is also notable that in response-or more likely retalia-
tion37 -the United States House of Representatives passed a bill
on March 3, 1999, which remains pending in the Senate, that
would require the Secretary of Transportation to prohibit the
operation of all supersonic transport aircraft that do not comply
with current ICAO noise standards to or from any airport in the
United States in the event that the European Union's Common
Position is adopted as a final regulation. Such an action would
only affect the Concorde, the supersonic aircraft used in com-
mercial operations by Air France and British Airways.39 It is sig-
nificant, however, that such an action by the United States
would not violate any ICAO standards because the Concorde-
which does not comply with ICAO noise standards-is only per-
mitted to operate in and out of the United States pursuant to a
waiver of the noise regulations for those aircraft.40
V. TREATIES UNDER AMERICAN LAW
The United States Constitution mentions treaties in several
places, but perhaps most important is Article VI, Section 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
state to the Contrary notwithstanding.41
36 This matter remains the subject of a dispute under Department of Transpor-
tation Docket Number OST-1999-5011 tided "Northwest Airlines, Inc.-Complaint
Against the Council of the European Union and the Governments of the 15 EU
Member States."
37 See 143 CONG. REc. E187-88 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Oberstar).
38 H.R. 661, 106th Cong. (1999) (introduced Feb. 10, 1999 by Rep. James L.
Oberstar (D-MN)).
39 See U.S. Could Ban Concorde if Europe Bans Hush-Kitted Planes, Environment
News Service (March 3, 1999) <http://www.ens.lycos.com/ens/mar99/1999L,03-
03-03.htmi>.
40 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 36 and 91.817-.821 (1999).
41 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The other references to treaties are as follows: U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10 (restricting the rights of the States to enter treaties); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2 (authorizing the President, with the advice and consent of two-
thirds of the senate, to enter treaties); and U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending
the authority of the judiciary to cover treaties).
20001 419
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The U.S. Constitution created a new principle of interna-
tional law, namely, that unless the text of a treaty requires sepa-
rate legislative action to effect its terms, it may be "self-
executing."42 In practice, this means that courts in the United
States regard treaties in the same fashion as statutes under
American law.
Because treaties are treated in a manner comparable to stat-
utes, the Supreme Court has also held that they are subject to
the statutes that Congress may pass for their "enforcement,
modification, or repeal. ''4 3 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
held:
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and
made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are de-
clared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and
no superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the
two relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to
construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done
without violating the language of either; but if the two are incon-
sistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided always
the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.44
For example, if there were a treaty between the United States
and another country allowing that country's citizens relief from
certain U.S. taxes, the United States could pass a statute to the
contrary, which-by the rule of later-in-time rules-would over-
ride the treaty, just as the treaty overrode the tax statute from
which it provided relief.45
Moreover, the Supreme Court has clearly established that it is
within the power of Congress to establish jurisdiction as it sees
42 See Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). ChiefJustice
Marshall wrote:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legisla-
tive act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be ac-
complished; especially so far as its operation is infraterritorial; but
is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective
parties to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our Con-
stitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, conse-
quently, to be regarded in Courts of justice as equivalent to an act
of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of
any legislative provision.
Id. at 313-14.
43 See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
- Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1887).
45 See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 85-94 (2d ed.
1993) (analyzing the standing of treaties under the law of the United States).
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fit-even if doing so extends the jurisdiction of the United
States to areas outside the territory of the United States. The
Supreme Court reviewed a situation in which this type of con-
flict arose in Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon.46 In Cunard, a number of
ship owners challenged the application of the National Prohibi-
tion Act47 that implemented the Eighteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution on prohibition. In response to that statute,
the United States adopted three rules in succession. The first
rule allowed the carriage of liquor by vessels arriving at port in
the United States provided that they were maintained under seal
and not removed while in port.48 In January 1920, that rule was
modified to allow the use of liquors by the crew on board the
ship.49 In October 1922, the Attorney General issued a new in-
terpretation that effectively held that the importation of liquor
into the United States on any vessel, and even transporting li-
quor on a foreign flagged vessel in the waters of the United
States, was unlawful." Cunard and ten other appellants chal-
lenged the application of the law on grounds that it was being
applied in an ultra vires fashion in that it sought to apply beyond
the scope of the statute and, indeed, beyond the jurisdiction of
the United States. 51 The Court, citing Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion from The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon & Others,52 held
that the jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory is abso-
lute and cannot be limited except as that country imposes on
itself.5 3
Thus, at least during Prohibition in the 1920s in the United
States, it was perfectly permissible under American law for the
United States to impose a prohibition policy on foreign ships
operating in, into, or out of American waters-even when that
policy was contrary to what the Court acknowledged was (a) his-
torically common practice in shipping, (b) the law of some
ships' home countries that required the boarding and provision
of liquor, and (c) customary international law.5 4 In essence, the
Court established that the authority of the American govern-
46 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
47 41 Stat. 305 (1919), repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
48 See Cunard, 262 U.S. at 120.
49 See id. at 120-21.
50 See id.
51 See id. at 103.
52 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
59 See Cunard, 262 U.S. at 124-27.
54 See id. at 129-31.
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ment over the air, water, and territory of the United States is
truly absolute, and any offense to customary international law or
incidental extraterritorial impact was within Congress'
authority. 55
VI. INTERACTION OF AMERICAN LAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, AND THE GORTON AMENDMENT
Clearly the view of treaties under American law and under
international law are different. American law essentially estab-
lishes treaties as "gentlemen's agreements" where there are few,
if any, consequences of violation that may be pursued effectively
in the domestic judicial system. 56 In contrast, under interna-
tional law, treaties are viewed as binding "contracts." A contract,
however, is an enforceable agreement,5v i.e., in the event either
or both parties breach their duties, they may look to a third
party-generally a court and/or government-with the author-
ity to enforce the agreement and/or provide a remedy. Given
that there is no "super court" to enforce treaties with binding
jurisdiction and the ability to enforce its rulings over the coun-
tries of the world, it appears that the American view is not un-
55 It is notable that the supremacy of the national government over interna-
tional law or treaties, as established by the Supreme Court of the United States, is
not unique to the United States. This has been vividly demonstrated by various
members of the European Union whose courts have had an opportunity to rule
on this subject. In each case, those courts have gone to some lengths to establish
that in some form or another, their domestic laws are supreme over European
Union law, and anything to the contrary is permitted only at the will of those
countries' legislatures. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERALS ON
EUROPEAN COMMUNITy LAw, ch. 6 (1993) (regarding the reception of European
Community law in each member state of the European Community).
56 It is notable, however, that without statutory authority, the FAA cannot im-
pose a standard on foreign air carriers that exceeds ICAO standards and the FAA
may be enjoined from such action just as any party can seek a remedy against a
federal agency when it acts outside its delegated authority. SeeWALTER GELLHORN
ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: CASES AND COMMENTS 66 (8th ed. 1987); see also Brit-
ish Caledonian Airways Ltd. v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding
that Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFAR) 40, which prohibited the opera-
tion of foreign flagged McDonnell Douglas DC-10s in U.S. airspace when the
same prohibition had been imposed on U.S. flagged aircraft under different pro-
cedures, was beyond the FAA's authority because the Chicago Convention, which
was the law of the land, only required compliance with ICAO standards, and such
compliance was not in question). In short, the FAA could not override a statute
or a treaty with a regulation. See also Stephen D. McCreary, The Chicago Conven-
tion: Article 33 and the SFAR 40 Episode, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 721, 727-35 (1989)
(discussing British Caledonian Airways).
57 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 322 (6th ed. 1990).
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realistic.58 On the other hand, arbitration proceedings have
frequently been used to vindicate treaty rights, and arbitral deci-
sions are generally respected by the parties to the arbitration.
Under American law, and particularly in light of the Supreme
Court's holding in Cunard, it seems indisputable that the Gorton
Amendment is legal and enforceable under American law. In
essence, when the United States Senate adopted the various bi-
lateral agreements on international civil aviation to which the
United States is a party, those agreements became like statutes,
just as the Chicago Convention did.
On August 23, 1994, when the Gorton Amendment became
law as part of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization
Act of 1994, Congress effectively amended those "statutes" with
the substance of the Gorton Amendment. These "amend-
ments," however, are clearly viewed by the other party to each of
those agreements as a violation (or at least an anticipatory
breach) of the terms of those agreements-or perhaps a repudi-
ation of their terms (although no country stopped operating
flights to the United States in protest of the Gorton
Amendment).
While it appears that the Gorton Amendment added a condi-
tion to the bilateral international civil aviation agreements al-
ready in place, as noted above, statutes and treaties stand on the
same footing under the U.S. Constitution, with last in time tak-
ing precedence. We must therefore ask if the converse is true,
i.e., do bilateral air transport agreements with the language on
mutual recognition of certifications of airworthiness 59 and
granting the privileges specified in those treaties override the
Gorton Amendment if they were agreed upon post-Gorton
Amendment and if they grant those privileges without imposing
the condition of the Gorton Amendment? If this is the case,
then the countries with which the United States entered Open
Skies agreements after August 23, 1994 would presumably not
be subject to the restrictions of the Gorton Amendment.60
58 It would seem that, while the member states of the European Union were all
included in the group that filed the diplomatic protest against the Gorton
Amendment, they take a similar view of treaties. See supra notes 35 and 37 and
accompanying text.
59 See supra note 15 and accompanying quote.
60 See Model Bilateral ATA, supra note 16. The countries that entered Open
Skies agreements or had them pending after August 23, 1994 include Austria,
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Jordan, Luxem-
bourg, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Only the Open Skies agreement with
the Netherlands predates the Gorton Amendment.
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VII. CONCLUSION
While it is true that the Gorton Amendment is valid U.S. law,
and while it also possible (although more speculative) that
adoption of subsequent bilateral international civil aviation
agreements has overridden the Gorton Amendment for certain
countries, it remains very troublesome that the United States
unilaterally passed the Gorton Amendment without any debate
about its international consequences. In 1944, the countries
that participated in the Chicago Convention established a
framework for an ordered international civil aviation "commu-
nity." Those who framed and adopted that convention must
have understood that without such cooperation each country
would be free to establish its own-possibly self-serving-stan-
dards. They must have equally understood the potential con-
flicts that could arise, as well as the resources needed to ensure
compliance with each country's different standards. They must
have likewise understood that allowing different standards
would hinder the growth of, and continued cooperation within,
the industry.
In passing the Gorton Amendment-particularly without de-
bate-and, perhaps more importantly, without consulting its al-
lies and trading partners, the United States weakened the
confidence that those allies and trading partners should have in
their dealings with the United States. It is important that the
United States remain cognizant-perhaps more than any other
country involved in aviation-that the very nature of the avia-
tion industry demands international cooperation; setting a pre-
cedent that the United States deems itself free to change the
rules at its will cannot help but be met, sooner or later, with
comparable actions by other countries61 -possibly even in
retaliation.62
It is perhaps regrettable that the Aviation Assembly did not
choose to test the legality of the Gorton Amendment under in-
ternational law and the Chicago Convention. An action under
Chapter XVIII of the Chicago Convention might well have con-
cluded that, whatever may be the legitimacy of the Gorton
61 See, e.g., supra notes 35 and 36 and accompanying text (regarding the Euro-
pean Union's rules on noise regulation that some claim are contrary to ICAO
rules).
62 See, e.g., supra notes 37 through 40 and accompanying text (regarding the
possibility of the United States prohibiting the operation of the Concorde into
the Unites States if the European Union unilaterally adopts aircraft noise regula-
tions that the United States considers to be contrary to ICAO standards).
424
2000] GAMBLING PROHIBITIONS 425
Amendment under U.S. domestic law, a different standard
prevails under the Chicago Convention and international law-
one which fosters needed coordination and cooperation over
attempts by countries to unilaterally impose their views on
others.
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